No evidence for neural overlap between unconsciously processed and imagined stimuli by Dijkstra, N. et al.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2021-11-05 and may be subject to
change.
Copyright © 2021 Dijkstra et al.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any
medium provided that the original work is properly attributed.
Research Article: New Research | Cognition and Behavior
No evidence for neural overlap between
unconsciously processed and imagined stimuli
https://doi.org/10.1523/ENEURO.0228-21.2021
Cite as: eNeuro 2021; 10.1523/ENEURO.0228-21.2021
Received: 20 May 2021
Revised: 1 September 2021
Accepted: 2 September 2021
This Early Release article has been peer-reviewed and accepted, but has not been through
the composition and copyediting processes. The final version may differ slightly in style or
formatting and will contain links to any extended data.
Alerts: Sign up at www.eneuro.org/alerts to receive customized email alerts when the fully
formatted version of this article is published.
 
 
1. Manuscript Title  1 
No evidence for neural overlap between unconsciously processed and imagined stimuli 2 
 3 
2. Abbreviated Title  4 
ImaginationUnconscious 5 
 6 
3. List all Author Names and Affiliations in order as they would appear in the published 7 
article     8 
Nadine Dijkstra1,2, Simon van Gaal3, Linda Geerligs1, Sander E. Bosch1 & Marcel A.J. van 9 
Gerven1 10 
1. Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition & Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the 11 
Netherlands 12 
2. Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, United Kingdom 13 
3. Department of Psychology, Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands  14 
 15 
4. Author Contributions: Each author must be identified with at least one of the following: 16 
ND, SB, SvG, MvG Designed research, ND, SB Performed research, ND, LG Analyzed data, ND 17 
Wrote the paper.  18 
 19 
5. Correspondence should be addressed to (include email address)  20 
Nadine Dijkstra (n.dijkstra@ucl.ac.uk) 21 
6. Number of Figures       5 22 
 23 
7. Number of Tables        2 24 
 25 
8. Number of Multimedia 0 26 
 27 
9.   Number of words for Abstract           198 28 
 29 
10. Number of words for Significance Statement 66 30 
 31 
11. Number of words for Introduction   739 32 
 33 
12. Number of words for Discussion    1798 34 
   35 
13. Acknowledgements  36 
N. Dijkstra was supported by a Rubicon grant 019.192SG.003, M.A.J. van Gerven & S.E. 37 
Bosch were supported by VIDI grant 639.072.513 and L. Geerligs was supported by VENI 38 
grant 451.1.013, all from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research. 39 
 40 
14. Conflict of Interest   A. No (State ‘Authors report no conflict of interest’)  41 
 42 
15. Funding sources 43 




Abstract. Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. 45 
The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. 46 
Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived 47 
stimuli throughout the visual cortex. However, while representations during imagery are 48 
indeed only caused by feedback processing, neural processing during perception is an 49 
interplay of both feedforward and feedback processing. This means that any 50 
representational overlap could be due to overlap in feedback processes. In the current study 51 
we aimed to investigate this issue by characterizing the overlap between feedforward- and 52 
feedback-initiated category-representations during imagery, conscious perception and 53 
unconscious processing using fMRI in humans of either sex. While all three conditions 54 
elicited stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC), significant similarities 55 
were only observed between imagery and conscious perception in this area. Furthermore, 56 
connectivity analyses revealed stronger connectivity between frontal areas and left LOC 57 
during conscious perception and imagery compared to unconscious processing. Together, 58 
these findings can be explained by the idea that long-range feedback modifies visual 59 
representations, thereby reducing representational overlap between purely feedforward 60 
and feedback-initiated stimulus representations measured by fMRI. Neural representations 61 
influenced by feedback, either stimulus-driven (perception) or purely internally-driven 62 
(imagery), are however relatively similar. 63 
 64 
Significance statement: Previous research has shown substantial neural overlap between 65 
imagery and perception, suggesting overlap between bottom-up and top-down processes. 66 
However, because conscious perception also involves top-down processing, this overlap 67 
could instead reflect similarity in feedback processes. In this study, we showed that the 68 
overlap between perception and imagery disappears when stimuli are rendered 69 
unconscious via backward masking, suggesting reduced overlap between purely bottom-up 70 
and top-down generated representations.   71 
 72 
Introduction. Visual experience relies on neural representations in visual cortex, which can 73 
be activated in two different ways. Externally, by light bouncing off of objects and hitting 74 
the retina, from which signals are sent via feedforward connections to early visual cortex 75 




feedback signals from high-level brain areas, such as areas in prefrontal cortex, for example 77 
during mental imagery and dreaming (Dentico et al., 2014; Dijkstra, Zeidman, Ondobaka, 78 
van Gerven, & Friston, 2017; Mechelli, Price, Friston, & Ishai, 2004). It remains unclear to 79 
what extent activation patterns in visual cortex caused by feedforward and feedback signals 80 
are similar.  81 
 Previous work has compared neural representations during perception and imagery, 82 
revealing convincing evidence that there is neural representational overlap between 83 
perception and imagery throughout large parts of visual cortex (Albers, Kok, Toni, 84 
Dijkerman, & de Lange, 2013; Cichy et al., 2012; Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2017; 85 
Horikawa & Kamitani, 2017; Johnson & Johnson, 2014; Lee, Kravitz, & Baker, 2012; O’Craven 86 
& Kanwisher, 2000; Reddy, Tsuchiya, & Serre, 2010; Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, & Duncan, 87 
2010; Thirion et al., 2006). The strongest overlap between perception and imagery is 88 
typically observed in high-level visual areas (Lee et al., 2012; Reddy et al., 2010b; Stokes et 89 
al., 2010), whereas the overlap in low-level areas seems to depend on the required detail of 90 
the imagery task (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003) and the experienced imagery vividness 91 
(Albers et al., 2013; Dijkstra et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2012).  92 
However, while activation in visual cortex during mental imagery indeed only relies 93 
on feedback signals (Dijkstra et al., 2017; Dijkstra et al., 2020; Mechelli et al., 2004), visual 94 
activation during perception reflects an interplay between feedforward and feedback 95 
processes (Bastos et al., 2012; Bastos et al., 2015; Dijkstra et al., 2017; Dijkstra et al., 2020; 96 
Muckli, 2010; Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). To determine whether visual representations 97 
activated by feedforward and feedback signals do indeed activate similar neural 98 
populations, one needs to investigate a situation in which visual representations are caused 99 
by feedforward signals only and compare those to events that include feedback processing 100 
as well.  101 
 Backward masking has been hypothesized to disrupt feedback from high-level visual 102 
cortex to early visual cortex (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; Fahrenfort, Scholte, & 103 
Lamme, 2007;  Lamme, Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002; Roelfsema, Lamme, Spekreijse, & Bosch, 104 
2002; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012). In a backward masking paradigm, a briefly presented target 105 
stimulus is rapidly followed by a second, masking stimulus. Appropriate backward masking 106 
renders the target stimulus invisible. Several studies have shown that masking leaves the 107 




cortex (Jiang & He, 2006; Sterzer, Haynes, & Rees, 2008), while feedback processing is 109 
disrupted (Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007; Lamme et al., 2002; Mashour, Roelfsema, 110 
Changeux, & Dehaene, 2020; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012). These and other observations have 111 
led to the idea that the feedforward sweep is unconscious and that recurrent processing is 112 
an important factor in achieving conscious awareness (Lamme, 2015; Mashour et al., 2020; 113 
Tononi, 2008). However, the exact relationship between feedback processing and conscious 114 
awareness is still debated (see e.g. Boly et al., 2017). 115 
 In the current study we investigated to what extent visual representations in visual 116 
cortex are modified by feedback, by comparing conditions in which stimuli are consciously 117 
perceived, not consciously perceived and imagined. We rely on the assumption that 118 
unconscious processing contains less or no feedback processing, and that therefore 119 
comparing unconscious to conscious and imagined representations will provide insight into 120 
the effects of feedback processing. However, it is important to note that this is an 121 
assumption based on previous research which will not be tested in the current study. 122 
Therefore, the exact implications of our results need to be inferred with caution. More 123 
elaborate and nuanced interpretations will be given in the discussion. We quantified the 124 
representational overlap between the different conditions by training a classifier on one 125 
condition and testing it on another condition (‘cross-decoding’; Albers et al., 2013; Dijkstra 126 
et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2012). The only difference between the conscious and unconscious 127 
condition was the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the target and the mask. To 128 
cue visual imagery in a way that does not induce an informative cue-signal that can be 129 
picked up by a classifier, we used a retro-cue paradigm (Harrison & Tong, 2009; see Fig. 1B).  130 
 131 
Materials and Methods 132 
Participants. Thirty-seven participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision gave 133 
written informed consent and participated in the study. All participants were naïve to the 134 
aim of the experiment and most participants were familiar with similar visual perception 135 
fMRI studies. Two participants were excluded from the final analyses: one because they quit 136 
the experiment prematurely and one because they had misunderstood the task. Due to an 137 
accidental change in the refresh rate of the monitor (from 60 Hz to 75 Hz) the timing was 138 
slightly different for for 6/35 participants: presentation from 17ms to 13ms, ISI conscious 139 




condition and slightly longer for the conscious condition. Because this error did not change 141 
visibility ratings (unconscious: 1.37 (SD = 0.27) versus 1.35 (SD = 0.58); t(33) = 0.079, p = 142 
0.94 – conscious: 2.92 (SD = 0.37) vs 2.98 (SD = 0.61); t(33) = -0.25, p = 0.80) or 143 
discrimination sensitivity (unconscious: 0.19 (SD = 0.28) versus 0.03 (SD = 0.18); t(33) = 1.9, 144 
p = 0.07 – conscious: 3.33 (SD = 0.61) vs 3.82 (SD = 0.90); t(33) = -1.26, p = 0.22) we decided 145 
not to remove these participants. Thirty-five participants were included in the main analyses 146 
(mean age 25.9, SD = 5.9).  147 
 148 
Experimental design. Prior to the experiment, participants filled out the Vividness of Visual 149 
Imagery Questionnaire 2 (VVIQ2; Marks, 1973), which is a 16-item questionnaire that 150 
measures the general vividness of a participant’s imagery. The experiment consisted of two 151 
tasks, a perception and an imagery task, which were executed in interleaved blocks and 152 
whether participants started with the imagery or perception task was counterbalanced over 153 
participants. The perception task consisted of conscious and unconscious trials, which only 154 
differed in ISI between the stimulus and the mask: 0ms for the unconscious trials and 66ms 155 
(4 frames) for the conscious condition. We chose to operationalize conscious versus 156 
unconscious processing via experimental manipulation (strong versus weak masking) and 157 
not via post-hoc trial selection based on visibility reports, because this latter approach has 158 
been shown to violate statistical assumptions and may lead to spurious unconscious effects 159 
(for more details, see Shanks, 2017). During the perception task, a stimulus was presented 160 
very briefly (17ms), followed by a backward mask. Participants subsequently indicated 161 
whether the presented stimulus was animate or inanimate and rated the visibility of the 162 
stimulus on a scale from 1 (not visible at all) to 4 (perfectly clear; Fig. 1A). To prevent motor 163 
preparation, the response mapping for both the animacy and visibility ratings were 164 
randomized over trials. During the imagery task, two stimuli were each successively 165 
presented for 500ms, followed by a retro-cue indicating which of the two the participant 166 
should imagine. The participant then imagined the cued stimulus and subsequently 167 
indicated the animacy and the visibility of the imagined stimulus (Fig. 1B). The button-168 
response mapping for the animacy task and the visibility rating was randomized over trials 169 
to prevent motor preparation.  170 
 There were 184 conscious and 184 unconscious trials, 46 repetitions per stimulus, 171 




There were 144 imagery trials, 36 repetitions per stimulus, divided over 4 blocks. Each 173 
imagery block lasted approximately 7 minutes. The order of the different stimuli and SOAs 174 
(unconscious versus conscious trials) within the perception task and the stimuli and retro-175 
cue combinations during imagery was fully counterbalanced within participants and which 176 
task (imagery or perception) was executed first, was randomized between participants. In 177 
total, there were 8 blocks, leading to an experimental time of approximately 65 minutes per 178 
participant. Including breaks and an anatomical scan, this added up to 90 minutes of fMRI 179 
scanning time.  180 
 181 
 182 
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. (A) Masking task. A stimulus is presented for 17ms, followed by a mask 183 
(duration 400ms) after 0ms (unconscious condition) or 66ms (conscious condition). Participants had to indicate 184 
whether the stimulus was animate or inanimate and rate the visibility. (B) Visual imagery task. Participants 185 
were presented with two stimuli after each other followed by a cue indicating whether to imagine the first or 186 
the second stimulus, as vividly as possible. After the imagery, participants had to indicate whether the 187 
imagined stimulus was animate or inanimate and rate the visibility of their imagery. (C) Stimuli used: a rooster, 188 
a football, a fish and a watering can from the POPORO stimulus data set (Kovalenko, Chaumon, & Busch, 189 
2012). The neural analyses focused on pairwise comparisons between all possible combinations of stimuli.  190 
 191 
Stimuli. We used stimuli from the POPORO stimulus data set (Kovalenko, Chaumon, & 192 
Busch, 2012), which contains colour images of everyday objects and animals. From these 193 
stimuli we selected four (two animate and two inanimate) for the final study. The stimuli 194 
were selected based on (a) familiarity and visual difference, such as to maximise 195 




experiment. The stimuli were presented at 50% contrast on a grey background screen. They 197 
encompassed a 4 by 4 cm square which corresponded to a visual angle of 2.81 degrees. The 198 
stimuli were relatively small to prevent large eye-movements, which would affect our fMRI 199 
analyses. The mask was created by randomly scrambling the pixel values of all stimuli taken 200 
together and was also 4 by 4 cm in order to fully mask the presented stimuli.      201 
 202 
Behavioural analysis. To characterize performance on the discrimination animacy task we 203 
calculated d’ as the distance between the signal and the signal plus noise, calculated as the 204 
difference between the hit-rate and the false alarm rate (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). A 205 
high d’ value indicates better performance and a d’ of zero indicates chance-level 206 
performance.  207 
 208 
fMRI acquisition. Each block was scanned in a separate fMRI run, adding up to 8 runs in 209 
total. In between runs, the researcher checked in with the participant and asked whether 210 
they needed a break. The experiment continued when the participant said they were ready 211 
to continue. fMRI data were recorded on a Siemens 3T Skyra scanner with a Multiband 6 212 
sequence (TR: 1 s; voxel size: 2 x 2 x 2 mm; TE: 34 ms) and a 32-channel head coil. For all 213 
participants, the field of view was tilted -25° from the transverse plane, using the Siemens 214 
AutoAlign Head software, resulting in the same tilt relative to the individual participant’s 215 
head position. T1-weighted structural images (MPRAGE; voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1 mm; TR: 2.3 s) 216 
were also acquired for each participant. 217 
 218 
fMRI pre-processing. Prior to decoding analyses, data were pre-processed using SPM12 219 
(RRID: SCR_007037). All functional imaging data were motion-corrected (realignment) and 220 
co-registered to the T1 structural scan. The scans were then normalized to MNI space using 221 
DARTEL normalisation and smoothed with a 6 mm Gaussian kernel, which has been shown 222 
to improve group-level decoding accuracy (Gardumi et al., 2016; Hendriks, Daniels, Pegado, 223 
& Op de Beeck, 2017; Misaki, Luh, & Bandettini, 2013). A high-pass filter of 128s was used to 224 
remove slow signal drift.   225 
 226 
Multivariate pattern analysis. Multivariate analyses were performed using Matlab version 227 




identity per searchlight based on the beta estimates per trial. All individual trial beta 229 
estimates were obtained from one general linear model (GLM) which contained a separate 230 
regressor for each trial set at the onset of the image (or imagery frame for imagery with a 231 
duration of 0 (spike) for the conscious and unconscious conditions and a duration of 4 for 232 
the imagery condition (Dijkstra et al., 2017; Bosch et al., 2014). Additional regressors in this 233 
GLM were (1) the animacy response screen onsets, duration set to the time until response; 234 
(2) animacy response button presses, duration 0 (spike); (3) the visibility response screen 235 
onsets; duration set to the until response; (4) visibility response button presses, duration 0 236 
(spike); (5) onset of the first stimulus in the retro-cue task, duration 500ms; (6) onset of the 237 
second stimulus in the retro-cue task, duration 500ms and (8) a constant value per run to 238 
eliminate run-specific changes in mean signal amplitude. Finally, the average signals from 239 
the white matter (WM) and cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) (Caballero-Gaudes & Reynolds, 2017; 240 
Lund, Nørgaard, Rostrup, Rowe, & Paulson, 2005) as well as the motion parameters were 241 
included as nuisance regressors. Decoding within and across conditions was done pairwise 242 
between all combinations of the four stimuli, resulting in six decoding pairs, over which the 243 
accuracy was then averaged. Searchlights had a radius of 4 voxels, resulting in 257 voxels 244 
per searchlight on average. Searchlights moved through the brain based on the center voxel 245 
such that voxels participated in multiple searchlights (Allefeld & Haynes, 2014). Leave-one-246 
run-out cross-validation was performed, such that for each fold, a classifier was trained on 247 
three runs and tested on the fourth, left-out run. This was done for all comparisons except 248 
for imagery-conscious and imagery-unconscious cross-decoding, because these data already 249 
came from different task runs (see Fig. 1). Generalization across conditions is often 250 
asymmetric which could be due to a variety of reasons such as differences in signal to noise 251 
ratio between the two conditions (van den Hurk & Op de Beeck, 2019). Because we did not 252 
have a priori hypotheses about asymmetries in cross-decoding directions and because both 253 
directions revealed qualitatively similar results, we average across both cross-decoding 254 
directions before doing statistics across subjects. 255 
 256 
Psychophysiological interaction analysis. After identifying a visual area that contained 257 
stimulus information (significant stimulus decoding) in all three conditions, we performed a 258 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis to investigate differences in connectivity 259 




participant, the seed-region was defined as an 8 mm sphere centred on the peak averaged 261 
univariate activation over the three conditions, within a 16 mm sphere centred around the 262 
voxels in which decoding was significant for all three conditions at the group level (Fig. 3, 263 
MNI: -54 -65 -10). This approach ensures that approximately the same region was used for 264 
every participant while also taking account differences in structural and functional anatomy 265 
between participants. This method and size of region of interest (ROI) definition is based on 266 
recommendations in the literature for comparable analyses (Zeidman et al., 2019a,b). One 267 
participant was excluded because the t-contrast of the averaged activation over the three 268 
conditions versus 0 did not reach the statistical threshold of 0.05 in any of the voxels within 269 
the group sphere. Two PPI contrasts were calculated: (Conscious perception & unconscious 270 
processing) > imagery (feedforward) and (conscious perception & imagery) > unconscious 271 
processing (feedback). Connectivity with significant areas was compared in a post-hoc 272 
analysis by calculating the difference in connectivity between each two conditions (Fig. 4C; 273 
Friston et al., 1997). Note that the connectivity analyses were not stimulus specific; 274 
therefore, the first comparison, where we compare conditions that contained a mask 275 
(conscious & unconscious) with conditions that did not contain a mask (imagery), might be 276 
driven (partly) by processing of the mask instead of the stimuli preceding the mask.  277 
 278 
Statistical analysis. The application of standard second-level statistics, including t-tests, to 279 
multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) measures is in many cases invalid due to violations of 280 
assumptions. Therefore, we used permutation testing to generate the empirical null-281 
distribution, thereby circumventing the need to rely on assumptions about this distribution. 282 
We followed the approach suggested by (Stelzer, Chen, & Turner, 2013) for searchlight 283 
MVPA measurements which uses a combination of permutation testing and bootstrapping 284 
to generate chance distributions for group studies. Due to the large computational load of 285 
searchlight decoding analysis, per participant, 25 permutation maps were generated by 286 
permuting the class labels within each run. Group-level permutation distributions were 287 
subsequently generated by bootstrapping over these 25 maps, i.e. randomly selecting one 288 
out of 25 maps per participant and then averaging over participants. 10000 bootstrapping 289 
samples were used to generate the group null-distribution per voxel and per comparison. P-290 
values were calculated per voxel as the right-tailed area of the histogram of permutated 291 




whole-brain FDR-correction with a q-value cut-off of 0.01. Cluster correction was 293 
performed, ensuring that voxels were only identified as significant if they belonged to a 294 
cluster of at least 50 significant voxels (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2017).  295 
 296 
Data and code availability. All data will be made publicly available upon publication of this 297 
manuscript. Analysis code for this study will be made available via the corresponding author 298 
upon request.  299 
 300 
Results 301 
Behavioural results. To check whether participants indeed did not consciously perceive the 302 
stimuli in the unconscious condition, we tested their perceptual sensitivity and visibility 303 
scores. Whereas d’ was clearly significantly above zero for both the conscious (M = 3.74, SD 304 
= 0.87, t(34) = 25.40, p < 0.0001) as well as the imagery (M = 3.32, SD = 0.83, t(34) = 23.74, p 305 
< 0.0001) condition, this was not the case for the unconscious condition (M = 0.05, SD = 306 
0.20, t(34) = 1.57, p = 0.127; BF01 = 0.549; Fig. 2A). Furthermore, d’ was significantly higher 307 
for both the conscious condition (t(34) = 23.18, p < 0.0001) and the imagery condition (t(34) 308 
= 20.60, p < 0.0001) compared to the unconscious condition. d’ in the conscious condition 309 
was also slightly higher than in the imagery condition (t(34) = 2.62, p = 0.013). Furthermore, 310 
the visibility ratings for both the conscious condition (M = 3.03, SD = 0.54, t(34) = 10.94, p < 311 
0.0001) as well as the imagery condition (M = 2.91, SD = 0.38, t(34) = 11.76, p < 0.0001) 312 
were much higher than for the unconscious condition (M = 1.37, SD = 0.54; Fig. 2B). A few 313 
participants rated a proportion of trials in the unconscious condition as high visibility (Fig. 314 
2B), however, all of these participants still had a discrimination accuracy at chance (all < 315 
53.3%). Furthermore, there was no significant relationship between mean visibility rating 316 
and d’ in the unconscious condition over participants (r = 0.14, p = 0.41). Given the 317 
nonsignificant task performance and the potential confusion caused by the randomization 318 
of response mapping between trials, these high visibility ratings during the unconscious 319 
condition are unlikely to reflect true conscious visibility. Together, these results suggest that 320 
the stimuli were indeed strongly masked and therefore we were able to isolate feedforward 321 







Figure 2. Behavioural results. (A) d’ for the animacy task shown separately for each condition. The bell-shaped 326 
curves represent the distribution over participants, the boxplots indicate the four quartiles and the dots 327 
represent individual participants. d’ was significantly higher than zero in the conscious as well as imagery 328 
condition, but not in the unconscious condition. P-values: * < 0.05, **** < 0.0001. (B) Percentage of trials of 329 
each visibility rating (1-4) separately for the three conditions. Boxplots represent the distributions over 330 
participants and dots represent individual participants.  331 
 332 
Decoding within conditions. To investigate which areas represented stimulus information 333 
during the three conditions, we performed a searchlight decoding analysis separately for 334 
each condition (Fig. 3). Statistical tests were performed using group-level permutation 335 
testing as described in Stelzer et al. (2013) and corrected for multiple comparisons (see 336 
Methods). Significant decoding clusters are shown in Figure 3 and listed in Table 1. The cut-337 
off accuracy value for significance was 0.508 for the unconscious and conscious conditions 338 
and 0.511 for imagery. The relatively low decoding accuracy of conscious representations 339 
(~0.55) compared to other studies (~0.55-0.65) (e.g. Eger et al., 2008; Axelrod & Yovel, 340 
2015) is likely due to the backward mask, which adds noise to the stimulus response. Given 341 
the low temporal resolution of fMRI, this means that the BOLD signal at the time of the 342 
stimulus will contain a mixture of stimulus response and response to the mask, increasing 343 
variance unrelated to the stimulus and thereby decrease decoding performance. In line with 344 
previous studies (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2019; Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & 345 




as imagery in low- and high-level visual areas, intra-parietal sulcus and lateral frontal cortex 347 
(Fig. 3B-E). Interestingly, significant decoding of unconscious stimuli was only observed in 348 
left high-level visual cortex, temporal pole and lateral frontal cortex (Fig. 3A). There was no 349 
significant unconscious decoding in low-level visual areas. All three conditions showed 350 
stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC; Fig. 3E).  351 
 352 
 353 
Figure 3. Condition specific neural representations. (A-C). For each condition, significant decoding clusters are 354 
shown for various axial slices. The heatmap indicates average decoding accuracy. (D-E) Significant decoding 355 
accuracy clusters (D) unique for each condition and (E) spatially overlapping between conditions. Significant 356 
decoding accuracy was found in all three conditions (indicated in black, circled in red) around the left lateral 357 
occipital cortex (LOC) at MNI coordinates -54 -65 -10. Decoding accuracies for the three conditions (UP = 358 
unconscious processing, CP = conscious perception, IM = imagery) within this ROI are plotted, with the error 359 
bars indicating the standard error of the mean (SEM).  360 
 361 
Table 1. Significant within decoding clusters. Atlas labels determined using the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et 362 
al. 2002) on the basis of the MNI coordinates of the peak decoding accuracy.  363 
Lobe Atlas label Condition MNI peak N voxels Peak accuracy 
 
    X Y  Z     
Occipital Occipital_Sup_R Conscious 30 -76 46 394 0.52 
 
Occipital_Inf_L Conscious -48 -70 -6 9302 0.54 
 





Occipital_Inf_R Imagery 46 -76 -2 459 0.53 
 
Cuneus_L Conscious 0 -72 34 171 0.52 
 
Calcarine_R Conscious 12 -60 14 115 0.52 
 
    
   
    
Temporal Temporal_Sup_L Conscious -58 0 -4 951 0.53 
 
Temporal_Sup_R Conscious 68 -26 2 395 0.53 
 
    64 -2 -10 220 0.52 
 
Temporal_Sup_L Imagery -64 -38 20 100 0.53 
 
Temporal_Mid_L Imagery -60 -20 -20 182 0.53 
 
Temporal_Inf_L Unconscious -56 -62 -6 86 0.52 
 
Temporal_Pole_Sup_R Unconscious 52 14 -12 91 0.52 
 
    
   
    
Parietal Parietal_Inf_L Conscious -32 -36 40 72 0.52 
 
Parietal_Inf_R Imagery 40 -40 56 143 0.53 
 
Precuneus_L Conscious -14 -58 68 110 0.52 
 
Precuneus_R Imagery 20 -72 46 284 0.53 
 
SupraMarginal_R Conscious 52 -30 46 485 0.52 
 
  Imagery 64 -22 40 90 0.52 
 
Cingulum_Mid_L Imagery -4 30 32 263 0.53 
 
Cingulum_Mid_R Conscious 8 -34 42 56 0.52 
 
    
   
    
Frontal Frontal_Sup_Medial_L Conscious -6 58 22 468 0.52 
 
Frontal_Sup_R Conscious 18 52 26 91 0.52 
 
  Imagery 24 -4 60 172 0.53 
 
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L Conscious -48 18 28 1738 0.53 
 
  Unconscious 44 36 16 62 0.52 
 
Frontal_Med_Orb_R Conscious 2 46 -4 575 0.52 
 
Supp_Motor_Area_L Imagery -6 4 68 557 0.63 
 
Precentral_L Conscious -56 -2 26 76 0.52 
 
  Imagery -56 8 26 59 0.52 
 
    
   
    
Cerebellum Cerebellum_Crus2_R Conscious 30 -80 -40 71 0.52 
 364 
 365 
Psychophysiological interaction analysis. The decoding analysis showed that left LOC 366 
contained stimulus information during all three conditions (Fig. 3E, lateral view), suggesting 367 
that this area might be where feedback and feedforward signals overlap. Before directly 368 
investigating the representational overlap between conditions using across-condition 369 
decoding generalisation, we first investigated whether this area indeed showed more 370 
feedback connectivity during conscious perception and imagery compared to unconscious 371 




compared to imagery. To investigate this, we performed a PPI analysis to characterize 373 
differences in brain connectivity between the three conditions (Fig. 4, Table 2).  374 
 375 
 376 
Figure 4. Psychophysiological interactions with left LOC as seed region. (A) The blue dot illustrates the 377 
location of the seed region, red-yellow indicates brain areas that showed significantly stronger connectivity 378 
with left LOC during conscious perception (CP) and unconscious processing (UP) compared to imagery (IM), i.e. 379 
in conditions where feedforward connections were present versus not. (B) The blue dot indicates the location 380 
of the seed region, red-yellow indicates brain areas that showed significantly stronger connectivity with left 381 
LOC during conscious perception and imagery compared to unconscious processing, i.e. in conditions where 382 
feedback connections were present versus not (C) Direct comparisons of connectivity between all conditions 383 
for left high-level visual cortex and early visual cortex (EVC; left); left high-level visual cortex and left 384 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (ldlPFC; middle) and left high-level visual cortex and right dorsolateral prefrontal 385 
cortex (rdlPFC). Boxplots indicate variance over participants and dots represent individual participants. ** p < 386 
0.005, *** p < 0.0005.  387 
 388 
In line with the predictions, there was stronger connectivity during conscious perception 389 
and unconscious processing compared to imagery between left LOC and early visual cortex 390 
(EVC; MNI: -1 -85 9) as well as right LGN (MNI: 24 -29 4; Fig. 4A-C), in line with the idea that 391 
during these conditions there was more feedforward processing than during imagery. 392 
However, because these conditions also differed in whether a mask was presented 393 
(conscious and unconscious) or not (imagery), and the PPI analysis is not stimulus-specific, 394 
this feedforward connectivity might partly reflect processing of the mask and not the 395 
(unconscious) stimulus before the mask. Furthermore, there was stronger connectivity 396 




LOC and bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; left MNI: -45 36 9; right MNI: 48 36 398 
9) and right lateral frontal cortex, in line with increased feedback connectivity during these 399 
conditions. Post-hoc direct comparisons between conditions of the regions showing 400 
significant changes in connectivity (Fig. 4A,B) showed that connectivity between EVC and 401 
left LOC was stronger during conscious perception compared to imagery as well as during 402 
unconscious processing compared to imagery (Fig. 4C left). Furthermore, coupling between 403 
left LOC and left dlPFC was stronger during conscious perception compared to unconscious 404 
processing as well as during imagery compared to both conscious and unconscious 405 
processing (Fig. 4C middle). Finally, coupling between left LOC and right dlPFC was stronger 406 
during imagery compared to both conscious and unconscious processing (Fig. 4C right). 407 
These results indicate that, in line with our assumption, long-range feedback processing is 408 
indeed stronger during conscious perception and imagery compared to unconscious 409 
processing.  410 
 411 
Table 2. Clusters connected with high-level within-decoding spatial overlap-cluster. Atlas labels determined 412 
using the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002) on the basis of the MNI coordinates of the peak T-value for 413 
the PPI analysis.  414 
Lobe Atlas label Comparison MNI peak N voxels Peak T val 
 
    X Y  Z     




   
    




   
    
Parietal Parietal_Sup_L (CP & IM) > UP -22 -72 52 50 5.48 
  Parietal_Sup_R (CP & IM) > UP 16 -60 68 62 5.73 
  Precuneus_L (CP & UP) > IM -10 -52 20 53 4.6 




   
    
Frontal Frontal_Inf_Tri_L (CP & IM) > UP -46 34 8 219 5.95 
  Frontal_Inf_Tri_R (CP & IM) > UP 46 34 10 149 6.8 




   
    
Other Lateral Gen Nuc (CP & UP) > IM 22 -28 -4 80 9.12 
 415 
 416 
Generalisation across conditions. The above decoding analysis showed that left LOC 417 
contained stimulus information during all three conditions (Fig. 3E, lateral view) suggesting 418 




whether the representations between conditions were similar, we performed across-420 
condition decoding, where we trained a classifier to dissociate the stimuli in one condition, 421 
and tested it in another condition. In this analysis, above-chance cross-decoding accuracy 422 
would indicate that the underlying stimulus representations are to some extent similar. 423 
Significant across-condition clusters are shown in Figure 5 and listed in Table 3.  In line with 424 
previous studies (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2017a, 2019a; Lee et al., 2012; Pearson & 425 
Kosslyn, 2015; Reddy, Tsuchiya, & Serre, 2010c), we found representational overlap 426 
between conscious perception and imagery in visual, parietal and frontal areas (Fig. 5A, 427 
Table 1). In contrast, there was no significant cross-decoding between the unconscious 428 
condition and the other conditions in any brain area, suggesting an absence of 429 
representational overlap. Furthermore, despite the significant decoding in left LOC within all 430 
conditions (unconscious: M = 0.512, SD = 0.063; conscious: M = 0.519, SD = 0.097; imagery: 431 
M = 0.528, SD = 0.098), there was no significant cross-decoding overlap between the 432 
unconscious condition and the other conditions in this area, even at lower statistical 433 
thresholds (Fig. 5B).  434 
 435 
 436 
Figure 5. Across condition decoding accuracy. There was only significant representational overlap between 437 
conscious perception and mental imagery. (A) Significant cross-decoding clusters are shown for various axial 438 
slices. (B) Cross-decoding accuracy within the LOC cluster that had significant within-condition decoding in all 439 
three conditions (Fig. 3E), the same voxels were evaluated in all comparisons. Error bars indicate the SEM, n.s. 440 
= non-significant, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.005.  441 
 442 
Taken together, these results suggest that there is no representational overlap between 443 




observe significant representational overlap here, not because there is no overlap, but 445 
because we do not have enough power to reveal this overlap. The results presented in 446 
Figure 5B show that cross-decoding accuracy between conscious perception and imagery is 447 
significantly higher than the cross-decoding accuracy between the other conditions. This 448 
means that while we cannot exclude the possibility of overlap with unconscious 449 
representations, we can conclude that representational overlap with unconscious 450 
representations is lower than the overlap between conscious and imagined representations. 451 
However, this might partly be due to the fact that unconscious representations were less 452 
strong compared to the other conditions (see Fig. 3). We discuss this possibility in more 453 
detail in the discussion.  454 
 455 
Table 3. Significant across condition decoding clusters. Atlas labels determined using the AAL atlas (Tzourio-456 
Mazoyer et al. 2002) on the basis of the MNI coordinates of the peak decoding accuracy. Condition is not 457 
indicated here because only imagery-conscious across condition decoding was significant.  458 




  X Y  Z     
Occipital Occipital_Mid_L -38 -80 34 59 0.51 
 
Occipital_Inf_R 44 -78 -4 261 0.52 
 
Lingual_R 20 -54 -10 91 0.51 
 
  
   
    
Temporal Temporal_Mid_R 60 -34 4 122 0.52 
 
Temporal_Pole_Sup_L -46 16 -26 72 0.51 
 
Fusiform_L -46 -64 -18 641 0.52 
 
  
   
    
Parietal Parietal_Sup_R 32 -62 50 97 0.51 
 
Parietal_Inf_L -32 -52 42 113 0.52 
 
Cingulum_Mid_R 4 14 30 79 0.52 
 
Precuneus_L -16 -56 14 76 0.52 
 
Angular_R 48 -62 32 60 0.51 
 
  
   
    
Frontal Frontal_Sup_Orb_L -26 14 -14 59 0.52 
 
Frontal_Mid_R 46 52 8 113 0.52 
 
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L -50 12 12 183 0.52 
 
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L -48 42 0 52 0.51 
 
  
   
    








In this study we aimed to investigate the overlap between neural representations caused by 463 
feedforward versus feedback signals by comparing brain activity during mental imagery, 464 
conscious perception and unconscious processing. We found significant stimulus decoding 465 
for all three conditions in left high-level visual cortex (LOC). Furthermore, a PPI analysis 466 
showed that this area indeed showed more feedback connectivity during conscious 467 
perception and imagery compared to unconscious processing. These results suggested that 468 
this area might be the place where feedforward and feedback-initiated representations 469 
overlap. However, across-condition generalization revealed there was only significant 470 
representational overlap in this area between conscious perception and imagery, but not 471 
unconscious perception. These findings are in line with the idea that feedback changes the 472 
“format” of neural representations, leading to the reduction of overlap between 473 
representations caused by feedforward and feedback signals, but the presence of overlap 474 
between representations caused by feedback processes associated with perception of 475 
external stimuli and feedback processes associated with mental imagery.  476 
 The significant decoding of unconscious category-specific stimuli in high-level cortex 477 
agrees with previous findings (Axelrod, Bar, & Rees, 2015; Fahrenfort et al., 2012; Jiang & 478 
He, 2006; Rees, 2007). Although both conscious and unconscious category-specific 479 
representations were present in high-level visual cortex, we did not find representational 480 
overlap between the two. This is in line with previous studies using backward masking (Bar 481 
et al., 2001) and dichoptic fusion (Schurger, Pereira, Treisman, & Cohen, 2010). These 482 
studies also showed conscious and unconscious representations in high-level visual cortex, 483 
but no spatial or representational overlap between them. Conscious and unconscious 484 
representations may differ in several respects, including their duration, intensity, 485 
coherence, stability and reproducibility (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Schurger et al., 2010, 486 
2015; Tononi & Koch, 2008). It has been proposed that long-range feedback may stabilize 487 
activity in local neural processors, as if the brain “decides” what specific input it has 488 
received. The network’s decision, given the input, is what may be reflected in conscious 489 
access (Dehaene, 2014; Schurger et al., 2015). The stabilization of neural activity by 490 
feedback therefore may change the format of neural category-specific representations 491 
(Baria, Maniscalco, & He, 2017; Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Dijkstra et al., 2018; 492 
He, 2018; Weaver, Fahrenfort, Belopolsky, & van Gaal, 2019; Xie, Kaiser and Cichy 2020; 493 




Although an intriguing possibility, some previous fMRI studies did report cross-495 
decoding between conscious and unconscious conditions (Fahrenfort et al., 2012; 496 
Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002; Sterzer et al., 2008; Sterzer & Rees, 2008). In these studies, 497 
awareness of face/house stimuli was either manipulated by dichoptic fusion (Fahrenfort et 498 
al., 2012; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002), Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS; Sterzer et al., 2008) 499 
or binocular rivalry (Sterzer & Rees, 2008). Which specific brain areas retain information 500 
about unconscious stimuli likely depends on the methods used to render the stimuli 501 
invisible (Fogelson, Kohler, Miller, Granger, & Tse, 2014; Axelrod et al., 2015; Izatt et al., 502 
2014). Dichoptic fusion, CFS and binocular rivalry all rely on interactions between inputs 503 
from the two eyes and may primarily affect inhibition-adaptation cycles as early as V1, 504 
although much is still unclear at present (Axelrod et al., 2015; Rees, 2007; Tong, Meng, & 505 
Blake, 2006). In contrast, the neural effects of backward masking have previously been 506 
shown to disrupt recurrent interactions between high- and low-level visual regions (Del Cul, 507 
Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007;  Lamme, Zipser, & 508 
Spekreijse, 2002; Roelfsema, Lamme, Spekreijse, & Bosch, 2002; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012). 509 
Future research is necessary to fully determine the specific effects of each visibility 510 
manipulation on neural processing to unravel the discrepancies between studies and to 511 
understand why representational overlap between conscious and unconscious 512 
representations is sometimes observed and sometimes not.  513 
 The idea that feedback processing changes the format of neural representations 514 
suggests that the representational overlap between these different modes of perception 515 
should change over time. Because of the sluggishness of the BOLD response, fMRI lacks the 516 
temporal resolution needed to characterize such dynamics. In contrast, recent studies using 517 
methods with higher temporal resolution such as electro-encephalography (EEG) and 518 
magneto-encephalography (MEG) do indeed suggest differences in the timing of 519 
representational overlap between conscious perception, unconscious processing and 520 
imagery. During conscious perception, neural representations first change rapidly over time 521 
during early time windows, likely reflecting the feedforward sweep, after which 522 
representations stabilize later in time, presumably via recurrent processing (Baria, 523 
Maniscalco, & He, 2017; Cichy, Pantazis, & Oliva, 2014; Dijkstra et al., 2018; He, 2018; 524 
Mostert, Kok, & de Lange, 2015; Schurger et al., 2015). Recent evidence shows that neural 525 




only overlap with conscious conditions at early stages of input processing (until ~250ms; 527 
Meijs, Mostert, Slagter, de Lange, & van Gaal, 2019; Weaver et al., 2019). Furthermore, a 528 
recent MEG study revealed that representations during imagery mostly overlap with 529 
representations during later stages of conscious perception (Dijkstra et al., 2018; Xie, Kaiser 530 
and Cichy 2020). This supports the idea that neural representations of consciously reported 531 
and unreported stimuli are similar during initial feedforward (and likely local recurrent) 532 
processing, but that long-range feedback changes the neural representations, which then 533 
mimics the representations initiated by imagery-related feedback processing.  534 
 It is important to note that the exact relationship between (long-range) feedback 535 
processing and conscious awareness is still debated (see e.g. Boly et al., 2017). Some 536 
theories suggest that local recurrent processing within sensory systems is sufficient for 537 
conscious experience (Lamme, 2015), whereas others propose that communication within a 538 
broader network, including fronto-parietal areas, is necessary (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; 539 
Mashour, Roelfsema, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2020) and still others propose that activation 540 
of meta- representations is sufficient (Brown, Lau, & LeDoux, 2019; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). 541 
Here, we used perception rendered unconscious via backward masking as a proxy for 542 
feedforward visual processing and in line with this assumption, our PPI results suggested 543 
that visual activity was only driven in a feedforward fashion in the unconscious condition. 544 
However, it is possible that there was still some form of feedback processing present during 545 
the unconscious condition, either weaker or more local compared to the conscious 546 
condition, that was not picked up by the PPI analysis. This means that the absence of 547 
representational overlap between the conscious and unconscious condition might be due to 548 
other factors that are affected by awareness besides feedback processing. Future research 549 
directly investigating how top-down processing changes neural representations, using 550 
methods with a higher temporal resolution, will give more insight into this issue. 551 
 Finally, in line with previous studies we not only found significant cross decoding 552 
between conscious perception and imagery in several visual areas (Albers et al., 2013; Cichy 553 
et al., 2012; Dijkstra et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2012; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2012; Reddy, 554 
Tsuchiya, & Serre, 2010), but also in parietal and frontal areas (Christophel, Klink, Spitzer, 555 
Roelfsema, & Haynes, 2017; Dijkstra et al., 2017). Additionally, we observed stronger 556 
connectivity between LOC and the dlPFC during imagery and conscious perception than 557 




investigating the neural mechanisms of conscious reportability (conscious access) of input 559 
(Davidson et al., 2010; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Lau & 560 
Passingham, 2006; Rees, 2007). These studies, similarly to ours, have all focused on 561 
conscious access of an external stimulus, whereas a recent study showed similar feedback 562 
connectivity during conscious perception and mental imagery (Dijkstra, Zeidman, Ondobaka, 563 
Van Gerven, & Friston, 2017). The current results suggest that dlPFC is important for 564 
conscious access, regardless of whether it is internally or externally generated. However, it 565 
should be noted that our perception task was not passive; participants actively attended to 566 
specific features of the stimulus in order to judge its animacy. Therefore, overlap between 567 
imagery and perception reported here might (partly) be due to the employment of similar 568 
attentional mechanisms (Dijkstra et al., 2019). During both the perception and imagery task, 569 
participants had to attend to specific spatial locations and features in order to correctly 570 
execute the animacy task. This means that during both tasks, spatial and feature based top-571 
down attention was employed. Moreover, the increase in dlPFC connectivity during imagery 572 
compared to conscious perception might reflect the increased attentional load of 573 
generating a sensory representation in the absence of its corresponding input (Dijkstra et al, 574 
2017). Furthermore, the nature of the imagery task used here, in which the imagined image 575 
is presented relatively shortly before the imagery, might result in lingering feedforward 576 
activity. Several studies using the same paradigm only showed feedback processing during 577 
imagery (Dijkstra, Zeidman, Ondobaka, Van Gerven, & Friston, 2017; Dijkstra, Ambrogioni, 578 
Vidaurre, & van Gerven, 2020), however, we cannot completely rule out that the imagery 579 
also contained some feedforward processing. To fully address this, future research should 580 
investigate whether similar patterns are found with conscious but passive perception and 581 
with imagery initiated from long-term memory.  582 
An alternative possibility for our findings is that feedback does not change the 583 
representational format per se, but that during the conscious condition, feedback enhances 584 
representations of feedforward information, for example via gain increase (Reynolds & 585 
Heeger, 2009; Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012). Our results would then suggest that 586 
this kind of feedback-related enhancement is necessary to detect representational overlap 587 
between perception and imagery.  This would also mean that using more sensitive methods, 588 




neural populations recruited during imagery and those activated by unconsciously 590 
processed stimuli. 591 
Related to this, it is important to note that while we did find significant decoding 592 
within unconscious processing, the decoding accuracy in this condition was lower than 593 
during both imagery and conscious perception. This means that our power to detect 594 
representational overlap with the unconscious condition was lower compared to the other 595 
conditions. Therefore, we cannot rule out that our lack of representational overlap with 596 
unconscious processing is due to low unconscious decoding. It is theoretically possible that 597 
the amount of representational overlap with unconscious conditions is as high as the other 598 
conditions, but that the low power within the unconscious condition prevented us from 599 
detecting this. Low unconscious decoding may partly reflect an inherent feature of 600 
unconscious processes, in the sense that feedforward initiated representations are less 601 
strong  (especially higher up in the cortical hierarchy) compared to representations that 602 
have been stabilized via long-range feedback connections as mentioned above (Lamme & 603 
Roelfsema, 2000; Schurger et al., 2010, 2015; Tononi & Koch, 2008), leading to lower 604 
decoding accuracy and therefore less power to detect representational overlap (Fahrenfort 605 
et al., 2012; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012; Weaver, Fahrenfort, Belopolsky, & Van Gaal, 2019). 606 
Furthermore, although this type of masking has been shown to selectively disrupt feedback 607 
processing while keeping feedforward activity intact (Fahrenfort et al., 2007; Van Gaal et al., 608 
2011, 2008), due to the low temporal resolution of the BOLD signal we are unable to 609 
completely rule out a reduction in feedforward activity due to the masking procedure. To 610 
fully rule out this possibility, ideally, the within-decoding accuracy in all conditions is 611 
equalized experimentally, for example by lowering the contrast of the stimulus in the 612 
conscious condition (see Lau and Passingham, 2006 for a similar approach in behaviour). 613 
This is an interesting avenue for future research. 614 
 In summary, our results show that neural representations measured by fMRI, 615 
triggered by purely feedforward (unconscious processing) or feedback (mental imagery) 616 
processes show reduced overlap. This suggests that the large representational overlap 617 
between imagery and perception reported in the literature (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 618 
2019; Pearson, 2019) is undetectable for stimulus triggered activation in the absence of 619 
feedback processing. Our results suggest that long-range feedback processing alters the 620 




code. More insight into this dynamical process can be gained using methods with higher 622 
temporal resolution than fMRI. Future research should explore exactly how feedback 623 
changes the format of representations and how different methods of rendering stimuli 624 
invisible affect this process.  625 
 626 
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